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FEATURE COMMENT: The Draft OCI 
Rule—New Directions And The History Of 
Fear
After years of rancor and debate, the Office of Fed-
eral Procurement Policy and the FAR Councils have 
finally issued a proposed revision to the regula-
tions governing organizational conflict of interests 
(OCIs) in federal procurement. 76 Fed. Reg. 23236 
(April 26, 2011). The proposed rule marks an ex-
traordinary change of direction—in some ways, it 
reorders policy priorities built up over years of case 
law—and may reflect, in many ways, the drafters’ 
nagging ambivalence about the new direction. The 
drafters should take heart, though: the proposed 
rule generally marks a healthy new course, a strong 
step forward in rules that will likely continue to 
evolve for many decades to come.
A Brief History of OCI Regulation in the 
U.S. Federal System—The law regarding OCIs 
in the U.S. federal procurement system is, in 
many ways, among the most sophisticated in the 
world. While prohibitions against what we call 
OCIs emerge in procurement regimes around the 
world, including the European Union, see Direc-
tive 2004/18/EC, prefatory para. (8) (2004), and the 
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, see GPA Art. VI.4 (1994), the 
OCI rules that have evolved in our federal system 
seem, in many ways, the most elaborated. The new 
directions that the proposed rule marks may, there-
fore, serve as guideposts for future reforms abroad.
Although the foreign laws governing OCIs typi-
cally focus on contractors that may help write dis-
torted specifications to gain an improper competi-
tive edge in a future procurement—what we will 
call “biased ground rules” OCIs—the original U.S. 
OCI rules in the early 1960s grew out of a different, 
more amorphous fear. The concern then was that 
large weapon system integrators, which dominated 
the military-industrial complex at that time, would 
control competitions by controlling critical design 
information—that they would gain “unequal access 
to information,” due to inside information. See Tay-
lor, “Organizational Conflicts of Interest/Edition II,” 
Briefing Papers No. 84-08, at 1 & n.7 (August 1984) 
(citing authorities).
As the OCI rules were codified in the new Fed-
eral Acquisition Regulation in 1984, see 48 Fed. Reg. 
42102, 42152 (1983), the new FAR provisions, based 
on the previous guidance used by the Department 
of Defense, see 45 Fed. Reg. 51253 (1980); Taylor, 
“Organizational Conflicts of Interest in Defense 
Contracting,” 14 Pub. Cont. L.J. 158 (1983), took a 
relatively conservative approach and, among other 
things, did not impose postaward OCI disclosure 
obligations on contractors. See Taylor and Dickson, 
“Organizational Conflicts of Interest Under the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation,” 15 Pub. Cont. L.J. 
107, 111–12 (1984) (citing authorities). The FAR 
provisions were made part of FAR pt. 9, which 
governs determinations of contractor qualifications 
(“responsibility” in the U.S. system) before contract 
award. See FAR 9.100; see, e.g., Madden, Pavlick 
and Worrall, “Organizational Conflicts of Interest/
Edition III,” Briefing Papers No. 94-08, at 3 (July 
1994). While the 1984 FAR provisions extended the 
scope of OCI review, the core concern remained pre-
award, to ensure fair competition. See, e.g., Taylor, 
supra, Briefing Papers No. 84-08, at 2.
In the following years, much of the OCI regula-
tory regime was written by the General Accounting 
Office (later the Government Accountability Office), 
in its decisions on bid protests. See generally Szeli-
ga, “Conflict and Intrigue in Government Contracts: 
A Guide to Identifying and Mitigating Organiza-
tional Conflicts of Interest,” 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 639 
(2006) (discussing authorities). The seminal GAO 
decision was Aetna Gov’t Health Plans, Inc., Comp. 
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Gen. Dec. B-254397 et al., 95-2 CPD ¶ 129 (1995); 
see Cantu, “Organizational Conflicts of Interest/ 
Edition IV,” Briefing Papers No. 06-12, at 1 (Novem-
ber 2006), a 1995 decision drafted by Daniel Gordon, 
who now—in an interesting historical twist—heads 
OFPP. GAO’s decision in Aetna tried to make sense 
of the OCI regulations by identifying three distinct 
types of OCIs:
?? ????????? ??????? ??? ?????????????????????????
arise when a firm has access to non-public infor-
mation that can lead to a competitive advantage 
in a later procurement.
?? ?????????????????????? ????? ??????????? ??????
firm, as part of “its performance of a government 
contract, has in some sense set the ground rules 
for another government contract by, for example, 
writing the statement of work or specification.” 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????
the contracting firm, and the economic interests 
of the firm may distort the free and unbiased 
??????????????????????????
Aetna, at 8–9; Cantu, supra, at 1–2; FAR subpt. 9.5.
Of the three types of OCIs identified in Aetna, 
???? ????????? ????????????????? ????????? ??? ????????
the most concern at GAO. This seemed, in part, due 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
most difficult to identify because they are not limited 
to the contract itself; rather, they depend on whether 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ties not related to the contract.” Bartley, “Too Big to 
Mitigate? The Rise of Organizational Conflicts of In-
terest in Asset Management,” 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 531, 
539 (2011); see Gordon, “Organizational Conflicts of 
Interest: A Growing Integrity Challenge,” 35 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 25 (2005). That difficulty of monitoring 
potential conflicts, plus a deeper fear that contrac-
tors were penetrating too deeply into Government 
decision-making, helped to launch a series of deci-
sions at GAO sustaining protests based on “impaired 
?????????????
????? ?????? ???? ??? ?????? ????????? ????????????
cases was GAO’s general unwillingness to accept 
the affected contractors’ arguments that, by erecting 
firewalls (procedures and physical security measures 
intended to block the flow of information), the contrac-
tors could eliminate the bias that might infect their 
???????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
is at issue, it is difficult to see how a firewall within 
the conflicted organization would mitigate the OCI, 
in light of the assumption in these OCIs that all em-
ployees of the organization will work to further the 
organization’s interest.”); Bartley, supra, at 541 n.64 
(“GAO has held that a firewall ‘is virtually irrelevant 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
” (citing authorities)).
????? ????? ????? ????????????? ??????????????? ???
corrupted, and the broader bulk of GAO precedent 
on OCIs, played an important part in shaping DOD’s 
draft revision of the OCI provisions in the Defense 
FAR Supplement, which DOD published in April 
2010. 75 Fed. Reg. 20954 (April 22, 2010). The draft 
DFARS rule carried forward that fear of corrupted 
??????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ?????? ????? ???-
walls, standing alone, could not resolve impaired 
?????????????????? ???? ??? ????????? ??? ????????????????
any additional mitigation actions, is appropriate to 
resolve only ‘unfair access to non-public information’ 
organizational conflicts of interest”).
Shortly after the draft DFARS rule was pub-
lished, however, a new consensus began to emerge. 
The draft DFARS rule was heavily criticized by senior 
members of the procurement bar, in part because the 
DFARS rule in many ways simply codified the GAO 
case law on OCIs. There was, in other words, support 
for a new way forward. 
Proposed OCI Rule—The final DFARS rule set 
the stage for the latest draft rule, which would apply 
Government-wide. Recognizing that a new consensus 
was emerging, the drafters of the DFARS rule cut 
????? ???? ??????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ????? ?????????
weapon system procurements by DOD. 75 Fed. Reg. 
81908 (Dec. 29, 2010). Although there was statutory 
authority for this narrower approach—the enabling 
statute had, in fact, called only for rules governing 
weapon system procurement—DOD’s decision to 
retrench suggested that the Government-wide rule, 
when it emerged, would take a very different ap-
proach. The proposed OCI rule published last week 
proved that forecast correct.
The key elements of the proposed rule are set 
forth in accompanying Table 1. Some of the more 
interesting aspects of the proposed rule:
?? ?????????????????????????The prefatory 
comments suggest deep ambivalence about the 
rule’s new direction. The drafters ignore the 
final DFARS rule, and instead suggest that the 
original proposed DFARS rule—which tracked 
GAO’s case law—offers an approach as valid 
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as the draft Government-wide OCI rule. As a 
practical matter, however, now that OFPP and 
the FAR Councils have staked out a position 
that at least seems an evolutionary step beyond 
the DFARS draft rule, it will be difficult for the 
drafters of the Government-wide OCI rule to 
reverse direction, to retreat to the more “tradi-
tional” position in the proposed DFARS rule. 
?? ????????????????????????Following the lead 
of the DFARS drafters, the FAR Councils and 
OFPP would move the Government-wide OCI 
rule from FAR pt. 9 (contractor qualification) to 
pt. 3 (improper business practices). This remains 
a puzzling and internally conflicted decision. On 
one hand, the move reflects a rough assumption 
that OCIs, like personal conflicts of interest, 
should be dealt with under FAR pt. 3, where 
other anticorruption measures appear. On the 
other hand, the thrust of the proposed rule is 
that OCIs are not necessarily corrupt—in fact, 
as is discussed below, under certain circum-
stances a contracting officer may decide that 
the risks an OCI poses are marginal compared 
to the benefits of using a particular contractor. 
?? ?????????????????????????? ?????????????-
???????? ?????????????Another reason to move 
the OCI provisions back to FAR pt. 9 is that, as 
a practical matter, OCIs are likely to be dealt 
with as issues of contractor qualification any-
way. As Table 1 reflects, the proposed rule would 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF KEY ELEMENTS OF DRAFT FAR ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST (OCI) RULE
OCI: Contractor May 
Distort Competition 
(“Biased Ground 
Rules”)
OCI: Potentially Biased Contractor Advice 
(“Impaired Objectivity”)
Unequal Access to Information 
(no longer OCI)
Threat: Impair integrity of com-petitive process
Risk that Government’s business interests 
impaired
Contractor may misuse non-public 
information, or use for unfair com-
petitive advantage
Required CO 
early assessment 
(3.1206-1), case 
by case (3.1206-2), 
in evaluation pro-
cess (3.1206-3),  
and award 
(3.1206-4):
CO must require agency 
to produce list of sup-
port contractors that 
GUDIWHGVSHFL¿FDWLRQV
etc. (3.1206-2); CO 
should not rely solely 
on offerors’ information 
(3.1206-3)
x If OCI risk is an evaluation factor, 
communications that could result in 
changes to mitigation plan constitute 
discussions 
x OCI risk may instead be part of 
FRQWUDFWRUTXDOL¿FDWLRQDVVHVVPHQW; 
may withhold award because of OCI 
only after allowing offeror to respond 
(3.1206-4)
CO must assess bidders’ potential 
access to information; must insert 
clauses and provisions (4.401-4) 
(see Fig. 2) 
CO discretion:
CO PXVW take action to 
substantially reduce or 
eliminate risk (3.1203(b)
(2))
CO has broad discretion, and may accept 
risk (3.1203(b)(3))
CO must act if concludes (see 
4.402-3 and -4 (steps to analysis)) 
that unequal access to non-public 
information would give unfair 
advantage
How to address 
or resolve prob-
lem:
To address OCIs (3.1204-1) (see required clauses, Fig. 1, below):
x Avoidance
x Redraft statement of work to reduce subjective judgment
x 5HTXLUH¿UHZDOOVDQGRWKHUSURWHFWLYHFRQWUROV
x Exclude offeror (only as last resort), and, if potential unfair dis-
WRUWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQRQO\DIWHUDVVHVVLQJZKHWKHU¿UHZDOOV
and compliance efforts (i.e., mitigation) are enough
x NeutralizationWKURXJK¿[HGOLPLWVRQIXWXUHFRQWUDFWLQJ
x Mitigation, potentially per contractor mitigation plans (3.1206-
3(b)), under Government oversight (3.1204-3):
x 'HOHJDWLRQRIZRUNWRFRQÀLFWIUHHVXEFRQWUDFWRU
x 7RUHPHG\SRWHQWLDOO\ELDVHGDGYLFH(3.1204-3(c)(2)): requir-
LQJFRQWUDFWRUWRXVHFRQWUROVDQG¿UHZDOOVWKRXJK¿UHZDOO
WREORFNLQIRUPDWLRQÀRZDORQHJHQHUDOO\QRWVXI¿FLHQWPD\
LQFOXGHFRQWUDFWRU2&,FRPSOLDQFHRI¿FHU
x Obtaining advice from more than one source
x Determining risk is acceptable to Government (applicable RQO\ 
to “impaired objectivity” OCIs) (3.1204-4)
Waivers disfavored (3.1205; 3.1206-4 (best interests determination))
To resolve unequal access to infor-
mation (4.402-4):
x Dissemination by sharing 
non-public information with 
all,
x Mitigation WKURXJK¿UHZDOOV
(e.g., organizational or 
physical separations, access 
restrictions; info systems 
restrictions; independent 
compensation systems; 
nondisclosure agreements), 
subject to CO’s approval, 
perhaps simply by contractor 
FRQ¿UPLQJFRPSOLDQFHZLWK
52.204-XX, Access to Non-
SXEOLF,QIRUPDWLRQand/or
x 'LVTXDOL¿FDWLRQ, if no other 
means (4.402-2)
 The Government Contractor ®
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allow COs to assess OCIs during the evaluation 
process before award. The proposed rule would, 
however, discourage COs from dealing with 
OCIs as a technical evaluation factor, for by 
doing so, a CO would risk opening discussions—
and thus risk triggering a bid protest, if those 
discussions could not be held appropriately. 
As a result, the proposed rule instead in effect 
encourages contracting officials to assess OCIs 
much like any matter of contractor qualification, 
i.e., to review whether the apparent awardee 
can indeed resolve any open OCI issues before 
making award. 
?? ????????????????????????????Although the 
proposed rule abandons the traditional cat-
egories of OCIs, focusing instead on OCIs that 
threaten to undermine the competitive process 
versus those that merely pose business risks to 
the Government, as Table 1 reflects, to make 
sense of these new legal categories, we really 
need to superimpose the traditional three-part 
taxonomy. The new nomenclature may, ulti-
mately, only confuse things.
?? ????????????????—??????????????????—
???????? ????? The structure of the proposed 
new rule will mean several likely tactical shifts:
?? ?????????????????????????: As the discus-
sion above reflects, over approximately the 
past 15 years, GAO has focused closely on 
???????????????????????????????????????????
of a fear that contractors were being asked 
to take on too many decision-making roles 
in Government. The focus of concern under 
the new rule has shifted to OCIs (tradition-
ally, the biased ground rules OCIs) that 
may, in effect, corrupt the competitive pro-
cess. This means that contractors will focus 
first on potential conflicts that touch on the 
competitive process (assisting in drafting 
specifications, for example), and will worry 
??????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????: The rulemakers 
also abandoned GAO’s long-standing hostil-
??????????????????????????????????????????-
tivity OCIs. Under the new rule, firewalls 
are permitted—and, indeed, the CO may 
simply accept the risks posed by impaired 
??????????????????
?? ????????????????????????????????????????
Tactics: Figure 1, below, shows the clauses 
required when there is a risk of OCIs. In a 
nutshell, if there is a risk of an OCI, the CO 
must include a warning provision, 52.203-
XX, which in turn automatically triggers a 
clause, 52.203-ZZ, which will require ongo-
ing postaward disclosures. To avoid this 
cascade of costs and risks, contractors will 
be highly incentivized to find and resolve 
OCIs as quickly as possible.
?? ?????????? ??????????—Unequal Access to 
Information: Although the proposed rule 
shifts the provisions regarding unequal 
access to another part of the FAR, contrac-
tors are likely to look first to this legal 
“pigeonhole” for solutions. If a contractor 
can persuade the agency that a problem—
????????????????????? ???????????????????????
drawings, for example—is really a problem 
Figure 1: OCIs—Required Clauses
 
CO determines OCIs may arise 
(3.1207)?
Yes: 52.203-XX, Notice of 
Potential OCI. Offerors must 
assess and disclose potential 
OCIs, and propose mitigation. 
If 52.203-XX, then:
52.203-ZZ, Disclosure of OCI 
After Contract Award. Contractor 
must report any new or 
undisclosed OCIs; Government 
may terminate for convenience.
52.203-YY, Mitigation of OCIs, if 
OCIs may be mitigated by 
contractor plan, incorporated into 
contract; any changes by mutual 
accord; contractor must report 
noncompliances.
52.203-YZ, Limitation on Future 
Contracting, if this mitigation 
strategy to be used. Covers 
listed contractor and affiliates, for 
fixed period.
No
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of unequal access to information, and not a 
full-blown OCI, the contractor will likely 
be able to resolve the problem simply by 
ensuring that those who have “released” 
the information for use by the Government, 
and those who must have “access” to the 
non-public information, have endorsed the 
appropriate “access” and “release” clauses 
(see Figure 2). The new hierarchy of con-
cerns will, therefore, reshape how contrac-
tors address OCIs.
?? ???????????????????????One final problem 
with the proposed rule is that it lacks a concep-
tual model, which leaves problems unanswered. 
Why, for example, the volte-face: Why are risks 
to the competitive process now seen as more 
dangerous than biased contractor advice? The 
answer likely lies buried in policymakers’ under-
standings and intuitions, but those themselves 
can be captured by organizational models. A 
principal/agent model, for example, tells us that 
an agent’s (e.g., a contractor’s) conflicts of inter-
est should cause much less concern if the agent 
can be closely monitored, or faces potential sanc-
tions for transgressing. See generally Yukins, “A 
Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law 
Through the Principal-Agent Model,” 40 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 63 (2010) (reviewing literature), ssrn.
com/abstract=1776295. The model suggests that 
“biased advice” OCIs are viewed more benignly 
not because they are less dangerous, but because 
the principal buying contractor advice is really 
the agency (which can monitor a contractor’s 
conflicts relatively well), while the principal as-
sessing the integrity of the competitive process 
is all interested citizens (who cannot monitor 
contractors well, and so need more rigid protec-
tions). A conceptual model would thus explain 
shifts in policy, and would point the way forward 
for future reforms.
?? ???????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????
Finally, the proposed rule makes no effort to in-
tegrate OCIs with foreign developments, such as 
the European Commission’s interest in address-
ing conflicts of interest, European Commission, 
Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU Public 
Procurement Policy—Towards a More Efficient 
European Procurement Market, COM(2011) 15 
final, at 49 (Brussels, 27 Jan. 2011), available at 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/
docs/2011/public_procurement/20110127_
COM_en.pdf, or with the new compliance sys-
tems that contractors are rapidly developing un-
der the requirements of FAR 52.203-13. (There 
is no reason, for example, why contractors could 
not integrate OCI surveillance into a traditional 
compliance system; indeed, those who must com-
ply with contractual requirements for disclosing 
?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????-
Figure 2: Access to Non-Public Information—Clauses and Provisions
52.204-XX, 
Access to 
Nonpublic 
Information
52.204-XY, 
Release of 
Pre-Award 
Information
52.204-YY, 
Release of 
Nonpublic 
Information
52.204-YZ, 
Unequal  
Access to 
Nonpublic 
Information
$FFHVVFOa
GLVFORVXUHR
&RQWUDFWRUW
LPSURSHUO\
&RQWUDFWRU
YLRODWLRQV
6ROLFLWDWLRQ
LQIRUPDWLRQ.
1RQSXEOLF
5HOHDVHF
LQIRUPDWLRQ
3URYLVLRQI
SULRUWRVXE
UHOHYDQWWR
,IRIIHURUw
XVHJRYHUQLQJ
USURWHFWHGXV
RLQGHPQLI\*R
UHOHDVHG
PXVWVDIHJXDUd
SURYLVLRQIRUXV
LQIRUPDWLRQWRE
ODXVHIRUXVHi
WRRWKHUFRQWUa
RUXVHLQDOOVR
PLVVLRQRIRIIH
VROLFLWDWLRQ
LOOXVHILUHZDOOWR
QRQSXEOLFLQIR
HLIDFFHVVWRE
YHUQPHQWDQG
LQIRUPDWLRQFa
HLQDOOVROLFLWDW
HUHOHDVHGRQO\
QDOOVROLFLWDWLRQ
FWRUVif UHFHLYLQ
OLFLWDWLRQVDERYH
ULIRIIHURUSRVV
PLWLJDWHSUREOH
UPDWLRQLHLQ
HJUDQWHG
SHUKDSVFRPSH
XWLRQUHFLSLHQWV
LRQVQRWHV*Rv
WRFRQWUDFWRUWK
VDQGFRQWUDFWV
JFRQWUDFWRUKa
WKHVLPSOLILHG
HVVHVQRQSXE
PPXVWUHSUHV
IRUPDWLRQH[Hm
QVDWHWKLUGSDU
REWDLQQRQGLV
HUQPHQWPD\Q
DWKDV$FFHVV
SHUPLWV*RYH
V$FFHVVFODX
DFTXLVLWLRQWKUH
OLFLQIRUPDWLRQp
HQWWKDWILUHZD
SWIURP)UHHGR
W\RZQHUVLIQR
FORVXUHDJUHHm
HHGWRUHOHDVH
FODXVH0
UQPHQWWRUHOHD
VHLQFRQWUDFW
VKROGUHTXLUHV
URYLGHGE\*Rv
OOLVVRXQG
PRI,QIRUPDWLR
QSXEOLFLQIRUPa
HQWVDQGUHSRUW
QRQSXEOLF
;;LQFRQWUa
VHQRQSXEOLF
RIIHURUWRLQIRUm
HUQPHQWDQG
 
Q$FW
WLRQ
 
FW
&2
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action costs and improve the effectiveness of the 
regulatory regime, the rulemakers should look 
to harmonize the new rule with those parallel 
developments.
??????????—As the discussion above reflects, 
the proposed OCI rule marks a remarkable change 
in direction, in part because policymakers’ core con-
cerns—their core fears concerning conflicts of inter-
est—have themselves shifted over time. Because new 
means of addressing those concerns are constantly 
emerging and evolving, we know that the rules will 
¶ 148
continue to evolve. We can hope, though, that as the 
rules advance, they will mesh more seamlessly with 
other advances in procurement law, both here and 
abroad.
!
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE GOV-
ERNMENT CONTRACTOR by ?????????????????????, 
Associate Professor of Government Contract Law 
& Co-Director, Government Procurement Law 
Program, The George Washington University 
Law School; of counsel, Arnold & Porter LLP.
